Year
2005
Abstract
What is the proper role for inspections? Is greater consensus, both domestically and internationally, on the various roles for inspections as well as expectations regarding their ultimate effectiveness possible? The United States and a coalition of the willing conducted a war with Iraq that had as one of its declared objectives the disarmament of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD). For some, the war was necessitated by the failure of UN inspections in Iraq. Others argued that the war was unnecessary and that inspections would have worked had they been given sufficient time. These views were underscored by divergent views on what inspectors could accomplish, whether they required full cooperation, etc. This divide was apparent before the war and for some time after it began, although it has been eclipsed by the failure to find WMD in Iraq. Will this debate reemerge? What does it bode for the future of inspections? What are the lessons of Iraqi inspections? How will the experiences affect the credibility of inspections and other aspects of the international nonproliferation regime? These issues go beyond the Iraqi inspection efforts in 2002-3. Inspections in South Africa, in Iraq from 1991-1998, in Libya and elsewhere over the last 15 years also need to be addressed utilizing the existing knowledge base of US and foreign inspectors with first-hand experience as well as the relevant technical community. While this wider net needs to be cast, this paper focuses on Iraqi inspections in 2002-3 and their impact on possible inspection regimes in North Korea and Iran with a view to providing clarity regarding expectations, objectives and capabilities of inspections and elucidating both the potential and limitations of inspections for future nonproliferation missions.