Year
2001
Abstract
Under the auspices of the IAEA, a set of fundamental principles for the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities has been identified. In this respect, France has consistently pursued, for many years, an approach based on these fundamental principles. Moreover, a security culture has been developed which closely involves the competent authority, IPSN as its technical support and the operators. This approach is based on an extensive legislative and regulatory framework established at the state level, complemented by the concrete implementation of the various elements of physical protection in the concerned facilities. The paper describes the French experience in this area, its strength and difficulties encountered in the course of its implementation, as well as the road remaining to be covered. For example, the French regulatory system strongly relies on the prime responsibility of the operators, and lays down a performance-based approach rather than a compliance-based approach. Experience feedback in this field has indeed caused us to evolve from the original prescriptive approach, which we found difficult to apply, to a more flexible approach in which the operator has greater freedom of action and bears greater responsibility. A consequence of this approach, which has to be dealt with, is the necessity for a high competence for both the operator, and the technical support of the authority. Likewise, experience feedback leads us to base the implementation of an effective physical protection system on the defence in depth principle. In France, this concept is organised around prevention, management of the event and mitigation as regards the theft of nuclear material or the sabotage of nuclear facilities. It takes the form of several lines of defence including both administrative and technical aspects.