Fiber Optic Tamper-Indicating Enclosure (TIE); A Case Study in Authentication

A robust fiber optic-based tamper-indicating enclosure (TIE) has been developed by PNNL through funding by the National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Nuclear Verification over the past few years. The objective of this work is to allow monitors to have confidence in both the authenticity and integrity of the TIE and the monitoring equipment inside, throughout the time it may be located at a host facility. Incorporating authentication features into the design were the focus of fiscal year 2014 development efforts. Throughout the development process, modifications have been made to the physical TIE design based on lessons learned via exercises and expert elicitation. The end result is a robust and passive TIE which can be utilized to protect monitoring party equipment left in a host facility. The development process involved the implementation of additional features to provide evidence of the authenticity and integrity of the TIE. Determining how to verify the presence of those authentication features was also a major part of the development process. The lessons learned through the combined implementation of these two efforts provide a glimpse into how authentication can be designed into equipment during development as compared to simply designing a tamper-indicating enclosure. This paper will discuss the identification, design, implementation, and verification of authentication features of the fiber optic TIE and highlight the lessons learned throughout the process.