Year
2010
Abstract
Recently, a multi-laboratory team evaluated the proliferation resistance (PR&PP) technical risk characteristics of a number of generic nuclear reactors designs. The team used an expert elicitation process based on the GIF PR&PP methodology. Three general types of material acquisition scenarios were evaluated for each reactor type: 1) concealed diversion of material; 2) concealed misuse of the reactor to produce materials; and 3) breakout. The evaluations took into account both the intrinsic and extrinsic PR&PP characteristics of each reactor. This study showed that each reactor type has particular features affecting its respective PR&PP characteristics and that no type was clearly superior or inferior for the material acquisition scenarios considered. Areas were identified where safeguards approaches and technology could be improved through the use of safeguards-by-design, an important element of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative. Similarities and differences among the reactors were highlighted and paths forward for improving both the intrinsic and extrinsic aspects of reactor concepts to meet nonproliferation goals were identified. These evaluations are the first systematic, comprehensive proliferation resistance studies covering the spectrum of reactor design concepts.