Experiences of the Development of the Integrated Safeguards Approaches (for Japan)

Random interim inspections (RIIs) are very important inspection measures under integrated safeguards. Field trials in Japan were carried out to confirm the practicability of RIIs and to contribute to the preparation of Japanese authorities, facility operators and the Agency. The experience based on the trials will contribute to the future development of IS approach for other States. Introduction The concept of integrated safeguards (IS) is the optimum combination of all safeguards measures available to the Agency under comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols to achieve maximum effectiveness and efficiency in meeting the Agency safeguards obligations within available resources. IS is implemented in a State only when the Agency has drawn a conclusion of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in that State. Under IS, measures may be applied at reduced levels at certain facilities, compared with the measures that would have been applied without this conclusion. The Agency’s conclusion of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State as a whole is drawn on the basis of the results of activities performed by the Agency under the safeguards agreement and an additional protocol. The aim of integrated safeguards is to provide the most efficient means to realize the full effectiveness of the strengthened safeguards system. The measures of the Additional Protocol were never intended to be simply superimposed as a new layer of activity. The development of IS is the process of defining the optimum combination of measures carried out on a nondiscriminatory basis for all States that have comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols in force. Integrated safeguards would not be implemented in a State immediately upon entry into force of its additional protocol. It is necessary for the Agency first to reach a conclusion of the nondiversion of nuclear material from the declared nuclear activities and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the State as a whole, using current safeguards approaches at facilities together with additional protocol activities for the State as a whole. Once integrated safeguards is implemented, comprehensive information evaluation for the State as a whole would be an essential element and would play a key role in establishing and planning the activities to be implemented in the State. Under integrated safeguards, verification of nuclear material would remain of fundamental importance in the revised safeguards approaches for declared facilities, ensuring that the Agency maintains its ability to provide credible assurance of the non-diversion of declared nuclear material. Japan’s additional protocol entered into force on 16 December 1999. Since then, the Agency has been carrying out activities under the comprehensive safeguards agreement and the additional protocol. Due to Japan’s large fuel cycle, Japan and the Agency decided to prepare, as a preliminary step, IS approaches for individual facility types of the fuel cycle.