Year
2008
Abstract
The bilateral program for disposition of U.S. and Russian excess weapons plutonium has strayed so far from its original nonproliferation goals that Congress, in its fiscal year 2008 omnibus funding act, transferred the domestic mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel program from the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation account to the Energy Department’s Office of Nuclear Energy. Nonetheless, the program’s patrons in Congress continue to fund the project, diverting scarce resources that could be put to far better use on programs that would genuinely strengthen nuclear security. The MOX program hit its nadir in November 2007 when the U.S. and Russia signed a joint statement allowing the as-yet unbuilt BN-800 fast breeder reactor to be included in the Russian plutonium disposition plan, in direct contradiction to the original recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences. Even worse, press reports indicate that the U.S. privately agreed to allow Russia to reprocess up to 30% of the MOX spent fuel irradiated in the BN-800. These developments completely undermine the original goal of the program, which was to irreversibly convert Russian excess weapons plutonium into spent fuel. Instead, the U.S. will now subsidize what will be in essence a Russian plutonium production factory. The story is equally bleak on the U.S. side, where the MOX fuel plant now under construction may be commandeered to manufacture fast reactor fuel for the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership. This paper will outline the multiple failures of the MOX fuel program to meet basic security, safety and cost objectives, and will describe a process for orderly termination of the project that the next administration will hopefully undertake.