EVOLUTION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EURATOM SAFEGUARDS

The European Commission has now reached broad agreement with the European Council and other major stakeholders on the implementation of EURATOM Treaty safeguards and in doing so, concluded a major review of its work which began in 2001. The resultant new safeguards approach provides for a system of control and verification adapted to today’s nuclear environment, providing as it does a flexible, risk based approach. The linchpin of the European Commission's work remains the provision of the necessary assurance that nuclear materials are not diverted from their intended use as declared by the users. The purpose of such an assurance is self-evident as is its importance, given the likely resurgence of nuclear power in the European Union (EU). That said, this overarching objective is linked to crosscutting issues affecting several other European Commission directorates, international organisations and third parties: • A rigorous and effective assurance of use not only provides for confirmation but also acts as a significant deterrent to any misuse. Given the concerns over a range of illegal uses from simple neglect to radiological terrorism, this is a key issue. • It is clear that while all risks must be considered in any rigorous assessment of nonproliferation, those posed by EU Member States are not at the forefront of public attention. The same cannot necessarily be said for all third states, some of whom may be tempted to look to the EU as an illicit source of the fissile material. [Such material is acknowledged as the most difficult component to obtain for any would-be proliferator] A control on use under EURATOM Treaty safeguards therefore also provides for assurance on an international dimension and provides a solid basis for the verifications of the IAEA - the responsible body for world-wide safeguards. • Any misuse of nuclear material has the potential for a serious negative impact on the public perception of nuclear power and, subsequent consequences on security of supply. This paper details the European Commission's new approach which provides for a combination of audit/physical verifications resulting in an overall risk-based analysis of the EU fuel cycle, allowing resources to be focussed where most needed.