ENVISIONING A WORLD WITHOUT URANIUM ENRICHMENT

The proliferation of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plants poses an enormous threat to the nonproliferation regime. Attempts to limit the spread of enrichment plants are falling flat in the wake of growing interest among more and more nations in acquiring nuclear energy technology and achieving “energy independence.” Iran has led the way with claims that uranium enrichment is an essential component of a nuclear energy program. This is of course not true, since nuclear reactors can and do operate with natural uranium fuel. In fact, if the world nuclear energy system were reconfigured to utilize only natural uranium fuel, the threat posed by enrichment technology could be nearly eliminated. Yet such a course has many obstacles, not the least of which is that natural uranium-fueled reactors themselves are often regarded as proliferation threats. Natural uraniumfueled reactors historically have been the preferred means of producing plutonium for nuclear weapons. Civilian natural uranium reactors used for power production like the CANDU pose proliferation challenges because of the difficulty of safeguarding on-line refueling systems and the potential for diversion of heavy water for use in clandestine plutonium production. Current natural uranium reactor designs also present other difficulties including low fuel burnup, unfavorable reactivity characteristics, and the generation of relatively large quantities of spent fuel. However, there has been little research and development into improving natural uranium-fueled systems because of the ready availability of enriched uranium and plutonium in many advanced nuclear nations. This paper will examine the challenges that would be have to be overcome in order for the world to phase out uranium enrichment while continuing to utilize nuclear energy, and discuss ways to address these challenges.