Environmental Sampling Using Location Specific Air Monitoring in Bulk Handling Facilities

Since the introduction of safeguards strengthening measures approved by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors (1992-1997), international nuclear safeguards inspectors have been able to utilize environmental sampling (ES) (e.g. deposited particulates, air, water, vegetation, sediments, soil and biota) in their safeguards approaches at bulk uranium/plutonium handling facilities. Enhancements of environmental sampling techniques used by the IAEA in drawing conclusions concerning the absence of undeclared nuclear materials or activities will soon be able to take advantage of a recent step change improvement in the gathering and analysis of air samples at these facilities. Location specific air monitoring feasibility tests have been performed with excellent results in determining attribute and isotopic composition of chemical elements present in an actual test-bed sample. Isotopic analysis of collected particles from an Aerosol Contaminant Extractor (ACE) collection was performed with the standard bulk sampling protocol used throughout the IAEA network of analytical laboratories (NWAL). The results yielded bulk isotopic values expected for the operations. Advanced designs of air monitoring instruments such as the ACE may be used in gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEP) to confirm that the production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) is not taking place in a facility. Researchers at Savannah River National Laboratory in collaboration with Oak Ridge National Laboratory are developing the next generation of ES equipment for air grab and constant samples that could become an important addition to the international nuclear safeguards inspector’s toolkit. As described in this paper, location specific air monitoring could be used to establish a baseline environmental signature of a particular facility employed for comparison of consistencies in declared operations. Implementation of air monitoring will be contrasted against the use of smear ES when used during unannounced inspections, design information verification, limited frequency unannounced access, and complementary access visits at bulk handling facilities. Analysis of technical features required for tamper indication and resistance will demonstrate the viability of successful application of the system in taking ES within a bulk handling location. Further exploration of putting this technology into practice is envisioned to include mapping uranium enrichment facilities for the identification of optimal locations for installation of air monitoring devices