Enhancing Research Reactor Safeguards Through the Use of Mailbox Declarations

There have been historic examples in several States of research reactors being misused to produce undeclared nuclear material. However, misuse of a State’s research reactor was typically only discovered after further investigation into the State’s non-compliance related to other undeclared activities. Light water research reactors are typically designed with sample irradiation ports, where the introduction of fertile material can illicitly produce fissile material. Additionally, some light water reactors continue to be fueled by highly enriched uranium, which is of higher safeguards concern by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Heavy water and graphite reactors can be used for illicit plutonium production, which is of particular proliferation concern. Because research reactors are designed for flexible operations and small research reactors are less frequently inspected by the IAEA than other nuclear facilities (depending on power and fuel type, it could several years between inspections), the likelihood of timely detection of misuse by the IAEA is low. During a 2013 workshop on safeguarding research reactors, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom made recommendations to the IAEA on how safeguards could be strengthened for such facilities. One of the recommendations was to assess the use of “mailbox” declarations coupled with short notice random inspections or unannounced inspections by the IAEA at research reactors. An electronic mailbox declaration refers to the use of a secure information repository into which an operator submits operating reports. The near real time submittal of information enables the IAEA to better implement randomized short notice inspections. These mailboxes are not used for collecting and submitting State reports to the IAEA, but for collecting and transmitting operator data. The use of mailboxes, in conjunction with short notice random inspections, is in routine use for other facility types. This paper will assess the potential for the practical application of mailbox declarations for various research reactor designs and how the approach could be effectively used. First, potential diversion scenarios will be described and discussed. Second, operator data records will be discussed in connection to mailbox declarations, including an analysis of how the data could indicate research reactor misuse.