ENHANCED COOPERATION WITH SSACs/RSACs UNDER THE SLC

One aspect of the IAEA’s State-level concept is reliance on the support of State and Regional authorities in implementing safeguards while still maintaining the ability to draw independent safeguards conclusions. It is important that States and/or Regions have competent safeguards authorities and a fully developed legal framework to enable effective systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material, including the capability to make independent verifications. The IAEA is investigating the conditions under which enhanced cooperation and additional arrangements with SSAC/RSAC could allow the IAEA to make full use of their systems for routine safeguards implementation and focus its resources on State-level issues. The IAEA’s lengthy and active cooperation with the regional European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) safeguards system was the basis for the establishment in June 2011 of a “Reflection Group” composed of representatives from Department of Safeguards and the European Commission whose task was to review the existing cooperation arrangements and identify further possibilites to enhance them. The Safeguards Agreement of 1973 prescribed that Euratom inspections be observed by the IAEA, whereas the New Partnership Approach (NPA) of 1992 envisioned joint inspections, independent activities and data exchange. In particular the group was to explore how the IAEA could make better use of Euratom inspection activities, including independent inspections, and the conditions that would need to be met for the IAEA to ensure the quality and acceptability of the results. The Group identified over 130 potential areas for enhanced collaboration of which five areas were selected to be part of a 2012 implementation plan. The five key areas being investigated and implemented are; an ISO based quality management system for the Euratom Safeguards Directorate, safeguards activities in the EU nuclear weapon States (NWS), the application and verification of common-use safeguards seals; inspection information exchange and utilisation; the NPA principle of ‘one-job-one-person’. The implementation will initially concentrate on the two issues of common seals verification and improved safeguards approaches at two NWS facilities.