Economic Sanctions and Selectorate Theory as Applied to Nuclear Proliferation in the DPRK and Iran

Economic sanctions are often the most popular policy option in punishing states for participating in nuclear proliferation. The effectiveness of sanctions in producing favorable changes in a country’s nuclear policies is variable. Sanctions applied to Iraq in 1990 did not lead to favorable nuclear policy response. Yet the applications of sanctions prevented Taiwan and Libya from continuing their nuclear ambitions. Recently, the application of sanctions on Iran brought about a comprehensive deal in regards to Iran nuclear policy. However, the use of sanctions against North Korea have not prompted any change in their nuclear weapons policy. This paper seeks to explain the differences in the application of sanctions towards Iran and North Korea that led to success and failure, respectively. This paper utilizes the empirical analysis of economic sanctions application and efficacy and contrasts that with a mathematical model of Selectorate Theory that describes a theory of political survivability. Selectorate theory is the argument that a leader survives in office when they maintain the support of the winning coalition, a group of supporters that give the leader credibility in office. Sanctions, in regards to nuclear weapons, are only successful when they reduce the incumbent leader’s ability to deliver ‘economic rents’ to the winning coalition below the threshold of a challenger’s ability to deliver ‘economic rents’ in the same position.