Year
2011
Abstract
On 10 January 2003, the Democratic People‘s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) issued a statement notifying the international community of its intent to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) the following day. Article X of the NPT provides for states' right to withdraw from the Treaty. However, in the case of the DPRK, the technical requirements for withdrawal were arguably not met. Many in the nonproliferation community maintain that the DPRK failed to withdraw properly. Despite this, states parties to the Treaty have politically accepted the withdrawal by generally not contesting the correctness of it. Such a political reality leaves little room for legal arguments regarding the validity of the withdrawal; it does, however, demonstrate the disputed interpretation of Article X. By not contesting the withdrawal, member states and the United Nations Security Council have set a negative precedent for meeting Article X requirements, especially in cases of non-compliance with Treaty obligations. A loose interpretation of the right of withdrawal without following protocol could potentially weaken the Treaty more generally. How else, for example, can states parties take advantage of Treaty privileges without responsibility? This paper will analyze the correctness of the DPRK‘s withdrawal, the political acceptance of that withdrawal and the implications for misinterpretations of Article X rights.