DISCUSSIONS OF VERIFICATION OF A FISSILE MATERIAL CUTOFF TREATY

A universal fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT) will be a key building block in nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation and prevention of nuclear terrorism. Negotiation of an effectively verifiable FMCT has been pursued over a decade. The principle of “ trust but verify” has played a great role in arms control and nonproliferation regime. However, the Bush administration announced in July 2004 that while it supported negotiating a cutoff treaty, it would no longer support such a treaty with verification arrangements. The U.S. new position on unverified FMCT could damage efforts to conclude a meaningful treaty. In this paper, I will examine whether the FMCT can be effectively verified without compromising the legitimate security interest of the State Parties. Specifically, I will explore what kind of verification measures would be needed to effectively detect covert nuclear material production facilitates including reprocessing and enrichment plants, and whether those effective verification measures could be feasibly established while protecting national security secrets. Moreover, the cost and security benefits of a verifiable FMCT will be discussed.