Year
2011
Abstract
Secure Remote Data Transmission (RDT) plays a major role in the current and future concepts of efficient nuclear material safeguards implementation. This paper will describe achievements by EURATOM safeguards in the recent past. EURATOM safeguards are the only international safeguards regime having implemented a thorough safeguards regime in nuclear weapons states as well as in non-nuclear weapons states. In the 25 non-nuclear weapons states of the European Union as well as in France and the United Kingdom EURATOM is the partner of the IAEA, acting as a regional system of accountancy and control. The reduction of inspection frequency due to Integrated Safeguards and the different boundary conditions in the various member states raised a number of issues associated with the transmission of sensitive data and its protection. We shall describe Euratom Safeguards' significant experience in secured data transmission from a nuclear weapons state and discuss and explain the scheme which has been agreed with the IAEA for the transmission of data under INFCIRC/193. This scheme has been implemented recently, the current operational status will be described and discussed in terms of the added complexity arising from the fact that both safeguards organisations need to draw their own individual conclusions. Based on our practical experience, the paper will point out some security requirements for safeguards monitoring systems and, beyond that, will also refer to recent technical development activities aimed at enhancing the efficiency of RDT schemes by using information from facility-owned instrumentation. The paper will also examine the expectations associated with RDT and attempt to discuss risks and benefits, comparing costs and value in different cases. The various installation types present remarkably differing advantages and disadvantages. This can help identify where the introduction of RDT for Safeguards Inspections might be particularly useful.