DEVELOPMENT OF A STATE-LEVEL INTEGRATED SAFEGUARDS APPROACH FOR CANADA

The Protocol Additional (AP) to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/164/Add.1) between Canada and the Agency was signed on 24 September 1998 and brought into force on 08 September 2000, with Canada submitting its first AP declarations pursuant to the Additional Protocol on 06 March 2001. In the months following the Agency and Canada continued with the implementation of the routine safeguards inspection regime as well as AP measures in Canada, including complementary access, and addressing those recommendations forthcoming from the State Evaluation process. This ultimately led to the drawing by the Agency of the “broader conclusion” regarding Canada’s nuclear activities on 08 September 2005. The initial discussion and design of an integrated safeguards (IS) approach for Canada took place in the IAEA Regional Office in Toronto, Canada, in early 2002 and concentrated on facility-specific IS approaches, the procedure being followed within the Agency at that time. Following the drafting of the initial IS approach for Canada the Agency and Canada established an Integrated Safeguards Working Group (ISWG) to further develop the details of the approach. This group met on six occasions including at times with facility operators to provide in-depth insight into the operations of certain front-end conversion facilities, which were to be placed under safeguards. It soon became apparent through the further development and refinement of departmental integrated safeguards guidelines and approaches and advice being provided by the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) that additional consideration should be given to State-level factors which could impact the design of an IS approach. This led the ISWG to take into account those State-level factors, which in turn had a positive effect in the design of the State-level Integrated Safeguards Approach for Canada. In designing the State-level IS approach for Canada, consideration was given to the fact that, apart from those activities at the Chalk River Laboratories (CRL) the fuel cycle in Canada is based upon natural uranium fuel and that there are no enrichment and reprocessing activities in Canada. The natural uranium fuel cycle includes three conversion plants, three fuel fabrication plants, twenty-two on-load reactors and four operating dry spent fuel storage facilities. Currently the State-level IS approach for Canada is based upon four “sectors” with the two main sectors being the CRL site and the natural uranium fuel cycle. This paper will outline the roadmap towards developing the State-level approach for Canada, those elements of the State-level approach itself and discuss State specific factors taken into consideration for Canada.