Year
2015
Abstract
The reduction or elimination of nuclear arms is not likely to occur absent a lower perceived need for a nuclear weapons arsenal and confidence that other states are upholding their commitments. Lessons from verification of peaceful uses of nuclear fuel cycle activities by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) over more than 50 years has taught us that achieving confidence requires a coherent and comprehensive picture of the State’s compliance with its obligations. The IAEA’s State-level concept (SLC) has recently been advanced as a way to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards1. The SLC sought to address the shortcomings in the traditional approach that focused on verifying the nondiversion of declared nuclear materials at individual nuclear facilities. Instead, by designing a safeguards regime that treats the state as a whole rather than as a collection of unrelated facilities, and by piecing together a broad range of information encompassing declarations, technical monitoring data, and other safeguards-relevant information such as open source, nuclear-related trade, and information from member states’ national technical means, it may be possible to provide state-level confidence that commitments are being upheld.