Year
2018
Abstract
The International Atomic Energy Agency’s expert group on Application of Safeguards to Repositories (IAEA/ASTOR) recently summarized the group’s work from2011 to 2016, including a review of technologies for containment and surveillance (C/S) applied to geological repositories for disposing spent nuclear fuel and other accountable nuclear materials (IAEA-STR-384). The report also includes potential C/S measures for encapsulation plants as well as for the transportation of spent fuel. This paper describes those technologies and C/S measures, as well as technologies being developed for the identification of disposal canisters (canister ID).The permanent disposal of spent fuel presents a major new approach for international safeguards, as reverifying the final accountancy measurement is not feasible after the spent fuel has been emplaced and the repository has been closed. This results in an unprecedented reliance on maintaining continuity of knowledge (CoK) through effective C/S measures from final accountancy through encapsulation, transportation and final disposal. Here we review C/S measures described in the 2017 IAEA/ASTOR Group report and discuss potential additional measures not addressed in that report. The role of C/S for repositories is to maintain continuity of knowledge (CoK) on spent fuel (or other nuclear material under safeguards) following the final safeguards accountancy measurement through final disposal; that is, emplacement underground and final closure of the repository. Such C/S measures must include, not only the repository, but encapsulation plants and spent-fuel transportation, as these comprise a significant part of the challenge to confidently maintaining CoK.