Year
2016
Abstract
The concept ‘3S’ was introduced in the G8 Summit in 2008. By introducing the concept of 3S, balanced consideration on the 3S was expected. Since then, research on the 3S interface and synergy has been performed but could not draw the meaningful results. Fukushima accident in 2011 gave intuition to revisit the interface between safety and security. Safety-security interface was highlighted in the 2012 Seoul Nuclear security summit and was included in the Communique. 3S interface could be reviewed according to the case 1) safety and security requirements are in conflict 2) safety and security requirements are overlapped 3) both safety and security requirements are omitted. These all cases would cause the problems. To avoid problems, systematic consideration on the 3S from the design stage is required. For this purpose, legislation to require the 3S interface is indispensable. Also, establishment of the communication channels among 3S regulators, understanding of the 3S, 3S culture to understand the importance and due priorities of each 3S and consistent use of the terminology would be useful. Researches on the 3S interfaces showed that interface and synergy between safety and security, security and safeguards are meaningful in that it shares the same objectives. Examples of the safety and security interface are vital area identification, establishment of the design basis threat, treatment of the aircraft crush, cyber security issue and so on. Examples of the security and safeguards interface, however, are few. Two views of the nuclear material accounting and control is one of the safeguards and security interface issue. In this paper, we focused on the safety and security interface case to identify the importance and the consequence. We introduce the considerations in view of nuclear security by reviewing the stress test results. Through the review, we will revisit the meaning of the 3S interface and suggest how to improve the overall process in view of regulatory view point.