THE CONFLICTING GOALS OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION AND MATERIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Conflicts occur when physical protection (PP) systems intended to limit access to nuclear material make it difficult to perform routine material control and accountability (MC&A) activities. Resolution of these conflicts requires tradeoffs to preserve, without compromise, the goals of both PP and MC&A. It is common to routinely analyze risk of theft or diversion of nuclear materials, either by insiders or outsiders. Material control features are often implemented to address theft or diversion by insiders. These include administrative measures such as two-person rule and daily administrative checks; they also include personnel access control and material access control (tie-downs, cages, etc.). Material access control measures that limit insider access to nuclear material can also provide an important element for protection against outsider theft, an increase in the delay associated with removal of a significant quantity of the material from its storage position. This delay is necessary to allow protective force response to alarms generated by the removal attempt. Some of the material access control features impact the ability to perform MC&A functions, both routine activities and the more extensive activities associated with physical inventories, such as verifying the integrity of containers and tamper-indicating devices and performing confirmation and verification measurements. This paper will examine those impacts and the techniques that are commonly used to accomplish the necessary and required goals of physical protection and material control and accountability.