Year
2006
Abstract
Binding assurances of fresh fuel supply could provide a means for States to implement nuclear energy programs without the need to develop or otherwise acquire indigenous enrichment capabilities. Such an arrangement could encourage nuclear power applications - especially in developing countries - while minimizing the risks of proliferation. To serve as a nonproliferation measure, an assurance of supply arrangement should provide: Political certainty that the supply of fresh fuel would not be inhibited; Resource certainty that fresh fuel will be available when needed; and Financial certainty that the price a State will pay for its fresh fuel supplies will be attractive. Supplier States concerned with proliferation should seek to provide fuel in return for an undertaking by the recipient States to forego - or at least to postpone - their \"sovereign\" rights to developing or otherwise acquiring indigenous capabilities. States that might be interested to accept such restraints must see the assurance of supply arrangements as sufficiently attractive to encourage them to enter into binding agreements and thereafter to remain in compliance with the terms of the agreements. Assurance of supply arrangements should be seen as an option or an incentive available to States, not a condition imposed upon them. If a State elects to enter into an assurance of supply arrangement it would agree - in return for specific guaranteed benefits - to postpone exercising its sovereign right (as stipulated in Article IV of the Treaty for the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the NPT) to pursue enrichment in the context of peaceful nuclear applications. This paper identifies five models for assurance of supply which could address the needs of States seeking nuclear power and the supplier States concerned with proliferation. The models explore a range of supplier-recipient relationships, including purely commercial arrangements, intergovernmental arrangements and international arrangements.