The Case for the Application of Unattended Monitoring Systems In the Search for Undeclared Facilities

Undeclared nuclear facilities unequivocally remain the most difficult safeguards challenge facing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Recent cases of undeclared facilities being revealed in Iran and Syria, which are NPT signatory States, show both the difficulty and seriousness of this threat to nonproliferation. As with any threat, the most effective countering strategy is constant and effective vigilance. In the case of undeclared nuclear facilities, the most effective deterrent against proliferation is the application of wide-area environmental sampling (WAES); however, WAES is currently cost-prohibitive, based on the analyses done at STR-341 in 1995, and its recent re-visit. In the updated work, it was estimated to cost ~$10M per State and ~$10M in IAEA infrastructure improvements 1 . As a result of these costs for full implementation, the IAEA Board of Governors (BOG) has limited detection activities to within nuclear facility boundaries which is an approach that addresses the Iraqi discoveries of 1992. It is expected that technological advances will continue to accelerate in the areas of miniaturization of power sources, computational platforms, data communication systems, and sensors. Such technological advances will eventually allow for cost-effective targeted WAES and eventually full-State WAES. This raises the question of what the IAEA should be doing to prepare. In this paper, the author will make the case that the IAEA should begin experimenting with unattended monitoring systems (UMS) for undeclared facilities (undeclared unattended monitoring systems or U2MS) and activities within its current mandate. This can be done at a very low cost using existing monitoring technology such as air/water/gas samplers that are already commercially available and can be installed within facility boundaries. This paper will examine the three important benefits to be gained by the implementation of U2MS