The Case For A 2s Approach To Coordination Of Nuclear Safety And Nuclear Security Cultures

There have been many efforts in recent years to develop an effective and efficient means of coordinating, integrating, and harmonizing the elements of safety, security, and safeguards for nuclear facilities and installations. The approach to joint consideration of these three key elements has become known by the abbreviation “3S” and has been the subject of numerous papers, presentations, symposia and conferences. However, at the highest level of organization culture, the examination of the basis for defining and implementing a cultural program reveals that not all aspects of nuclear operations are aspects of culture - some functions are best considered at lower levels within the organizational structure. Not every program of nuclear operations should be considered a separate cultural program; many of these aspects are fully considered under the overarching cultural elements of broader programs such as nuclear security culture and nuclear safety culture. Nuclear installations have two basic questions to answer when considering the philosophy of operations: (1) is the installation safe? and (2) is the installation secure? These two questions support the concept of a cultural philosophy in that they are fundamental to the overall purpose of the installation management and operation. While the case for nuclear security and nuclear safety as fundamental organizational culture programs is well defined and documented, the case for elevating safeguards to the level of a cultural philosophy is less distinct. It may be debated that most, if not all, of the cultural considerations for safeguards (including nonproliferation, material control, and material accountability) can be addressed at a higher cultural level by the overarching elements of nuclear security culture and nuclear safety culture. Attempting to force a separate cultural-level process for safeguards results in redundancy and imprecise requirements. It may be that while 3S works well at the programmatic level, a 2S approach may be adequate and more appropriate for cultural philosophy. This paper postulates that while safeguards are a critical element of nuclear instillation operations on an equal basis with safety and security, safeguards at the highest level of consideration is a program function and not a cultural philosophy.