Canadian Experience with the Implementation of Article 34 (c) of the Canada-IAEA Safeguards Agreement

The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) is the Safeguards Regulatory Authority in Canada and as such has an interest in IAEA policy surrounding the determination of which materials fall under full-scope safeguards. Article 34(c) of the Canada-IAEA Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/164) (identical to the model agreement) requires that full-scope IAEA safeguards be applied to any nuclear material in Canada which has reached “...a composition and purity suitable for fuel fabrication or for isotopic enrichment...”. The IAEA’s interpretation of Article 34(c) has encompassed three distinct phases, namely: the 1972 to 2003 phase, during which time only materials in chemical/physical forms immediately suitable for fuel fabrication or isotopic enrichment, such as UO2 and UF6, were considered to meet 34(c); the 2003 to 2014 phase, during which time the IAEA’s Policy Paper 18 shifted interpretation of 34(c) to include purified uranyl nitrate; and, the phase covering 2014 to the present, during which time the IAEA’s Policy Paper 21 (PP21) has further extended full- scope safeguards to cover ‘high-purity’ Uranium Ore Concentrates (UOC). The CNSC is closely monitoring this current phase as Canada is both a major producer and major importer of UOC. This paper will describe relevant aspects of IAEA safeguards in Canada under each of these three phases, with a particular focus on PP21. In conclusion, this paper will share the CNSC’s regulatory perspective regarding the application of Article 34(c) in Canada.