Year
2011
Abstract
Spent nuclear fuel from the BN-350 reactor has successfully been stabilized, placed into long-term storage containers, and transported to a secure site in eastern Kazakhstan. Throughout this 15-year process, IAEA safeguards based on advanced attended and unattended safeguards techniques and instrumentation have been employed to detect potential diversion of this material. This paper describes the safeguards activities aimed at maintaining the ‘continuity of knowledge’ during the BN-350 project. An overview of the characterization process used to baseline the material is provided as well as the tools and techniques that were developed to follow this material as it was placed in long-term storage, where the material is classified as ‘difficult to access’ and kept under IAEA seals. Finally, an advanced technique developed to enable re-verification of the material in situ for the 50-year design life of the storage casks is discussed.