Battlefield Nuclear Weapons in India: The Case for Restraint

Nonproliferation strategy typically focuses more on preventing horizontal proliferation (i.e., preventing an increase in the number of states with nuclear weapons) than preventing vertical proliferation (i.e., preventing an increase in the numbers and types of nuclear weapons in states that already possess them). South Asia is an excellent example of the risks of vertical proliferation. India and Pakistan have developed and tested weapons with the stated intention of creating strategic deterrence with a minimum credible nuclear force. In spite of this, internal pressures in both nations to obtain the ability to fight a “limited nuclear war” are increasing. Such a strategy would likely require a new class of low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons. Pakistan has no official nuclear doctrine but the Indian government and press cite examples of how Pakistan appears to integrate nuclear weapons into its war fighting doctrine. Although India has an official no-first-use strategy for nuclear weapons, this perceived doctrinal asymmetry creates a “pull” that draws India towards adopting a nuclear strategy more similar to its main adversary. This could be called the deterrence/war-fighting paradox – a country may develop nuclear weapons intending them to be purely for defensive deterrence; however, once produced, their very existence creates forces that drive the country to plan for a larger role. The capability to engage in a “limited” nuclear exchange may actually increase the likelihood of such an exchange occurring. This paper, focused on India’s dilemma with vertical proliferation, first surveys Indian academic and official statements on the utility of battlefield nuclear weapons, then demonstrates that the military utility of these weapons is very limited in the South Asian context. The paper concludes that an India-Pakistan restraint regime for battlefield nuclear weapons is needed and explores how such a regime might be structured and monitored.