THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF MATERIALS ASSOCIATED WITH THORIUM BASED NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLES FOR PHWR’S

Year
2011
Author(s)
Brian W. Smith - Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
Matrin Robel - Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Charles G. Bathke - Los Alamos National Laboratory
Bartley B. Ebbinghaus - Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Brad W. Sleaford - Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Brian Collins - Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
Kevin R. Hase - Los Alamos National Laboratory
Andrew W. Prichard - Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
Mark T. Niehus - Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
Abstract
This paper reports the continued evaluation of the attractiveness of materials mixtures containing special nuclear materials (SNM) associated with thorium based nuclear fuel cycles. Specifically, this paper examines a thorium fuel cycle in which a pressurized heavy water reactor (PHWR) is fueled with mixtures of natural uranium/233U/thorium. These mixtures would be most beneficial for the export of fuel from a nation-state with a cradle-to-grave nuclear policy to developing countries interested in utilizing 2-3 reactors for power. This paper uses a PHWR fueled with natural uranium as a base fuel cycle, and then compares material attractiveness of fuel cycles that use 233U/thorium salted with natural uranium. The results include the material attractiveness of fuel at beginning of life (BoL), end of life (EoL), and the number of fuel assemblies required to collect a bare critical mass of plutonium or uranium. This study indicates what is required to render the uranium as having low utility for use in nuclear weapons; in addition, this study estimates the increased number of assemblies required to accumulate a bare critical mass of plutonium that has a higher utility for use in nuclear weapons. This approach identifies that some fuel cycles may be easier to implement the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards approach and have a more effective safeguards by design outcome. For this study, approximately one year of fuel is required to be reprocessed to obtain one bare critical mass of plutonium. Nevertheless, the result of this paper suggests that all spent fuel needs to be rigorously safeguarded and provided with high levels of physical protection. This study was performed at the request of the United States Department of Energy /National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA). The methodology and key findings will be presented.