An Assessment of Russian Nuclear Materials Safeguards

Since the early 1990’s, prior to the demise of the Former Soviet Union, there has been considerable international concern over the security of the Russian nuclear weapons and nuclear materials. After the breakup, the earlier system of personal control of material was no longer adequate likewise the state controls on the individual were relaxed or eliminated altogether. Having been one of the first Americans’s to have the opportunity to work directly with the Russian nuclear institutes on the Topaz space reactor program and later on the Material Protection, Control and Accountability (MPC&A) program I witnessed firsthand the critical needs facing the Russian institutes in nuclear material safeguards. This provided a direct view of the financial issues facing Russia from guards sleeping at their posts to impressive and innovative nuclear systems whose missions had been cancelled. Over the past 18 years significant changes have been implemented within Russia including the handling and dismantling of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, the rebuild of many thousand new weapons and the processing, packaging and storage of nuclear materials or conversely the down-blending of hundreds of metric tons of special nuclear materials. Material safeguards have steadily improved and the legal basis for physical protection and material accounting has been established. The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the changes within the Russian nuclear complex, their nuclear stockpile and material safeguards. Furthermore the paper will show how the Russian government planned expansion of nuclear power also incorporates improvements in their nuclear material safeguards, the environment and consolidation. These large changes constitute a new baseline for nuclear agencies within Russia, a break from the past that needs to be recognized and appreciated, while opening up new opportunities for US and international nonproliferation and counter-terrorism programs.