ASSESSING MOTIVATION AS A MEANS OF DETERMINING THE RISK OF PROLIFERATION

Nuclear safeguards comprise a set of detection/confidence-building measures that have been developed to provide the international community with assurance that states are complying with their nonproliferation commitments. The safeguards system has been undergoing substantial change and development over the past ten years as identified weaknesses of the system are being addressed. Achieving safeguards objectives requires that the safeguards system be effective, but the international community also requires the system to be cost-efficient. Consequently, some have suggested that scarce safeguards resources be concentrated on states that represent a real proliferation risk, substantially reducing safeguards effort in states considered to pose little or no such risk. This raises some difficult issues—not only the political requirement to avoid discrimination, but also the need to ensure that reductions in safeguards intensity do not inadvertently create new risks. With particular reference to “motivation” as a factor, this paper explores whether assessment of proliferation risk is as straightforward as some believe, and whether it is appropriate to allocate safeguards resources based on risk assessment.