Arms Control Verification – Recent Studies at the UK Atomic Weapons Establishment

AWE has undertaken a programme of research to study techniques and technologies with the potential for application to the verification of any future arrangement for the control, reduction and ultimate elimination of nuclear weapon stockpiles. This paper presents observations and comments on the issues to be faced when addressing the problem of monitoring a nuclear weapon complex. The particular problem of nuclear weapon component verification is that they possess attributes which material does not. Examples are size, shape and characteristic mass. Any of these, if revealed during verification measurements may breach State sensitivities or lead to proliferation. The programme focussed on an assessment of the technology available to verify: that an item declared to be a nuclear warhead, or a component from a nuclear warhead, is consistent with that declaration; and dismantlement of warheads and their components. Access for verification inspections of a nuclear weapons complex was also trialled. During the programme, radiometric Non Destructive Assay measurements have been made on United Kingdom warheads and their fissile components. Studies were also made of the interaction of an exercise inspection team with the facilities in which the measurements were made. These observations constitute a valuable knowledge base associated with verification measurements and on-site inspection protocols.