An Architectural Approach to Authentication and Certification of Arms Control Equipment

Research and development associated with authentication and certification of potential equipment, proposed for use in future nuclear arms control or reduction treaties, has been an ongoing effort for the past 30 years. In the late 1990’s, joint DOE-DoD funded groups of subject matter experts began to meet on specific authentication/certification related topics. Two of these groups included the Information Barrier Working Group in January 1999 and the Authentication Task Force in September 2000. The focus of these groups began to explore the questions surrounding nuclear warhead dismantlement scenarios, and how equipment might be used, and data generated which can be trusted while not releasing sensitive data beyond what may be agreed in the treaty. The output from these working groups and more recent efforts highlight the continued challenge of providing the monitoring party with assurance that the equipment is authentic while simultaneously giving the host the same level of assurance that the equipment will not reveal sensitive information when used in measurements on sensitive items. The problem becomes more difficult when the equipment includes programmable devices. This paper presents a novel approach to simultaneously satisfying the needs for authentication and certification of measurement and monitoring equipment, such as information barriers and portal monitors , which could be used in monitoring sensitive operations. Specifically, this paper presents a system architecture approach that could satisfy the needs of both parties, even when complex programmable components are required. It identifies the components or modules that may be of particular interest to a respective party and creates a mechanism for that module to be provided by one party and while still being trusted by the other. It is the belief of the authors that the approach presented may offer a major breakthrough in this area. Both authors have had leading roles in certification and authentication research, and Dr. Tolk's involvement predates the formation of the Information Barrier Working Group in 1999.