Applying State - level Approaches to Arms Control Verification

Reduction or elimination of nuclear arms is not likely to occur absent a lower perceived need for a nu clear weapons arsenal to support national security. Achieving such confidence on a national - level is the grand challenge. Lessons from verification of peaceful uses of nuclear fuel cycle activities by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) over more than 50 years has taught us that achieving confidence requires a coherent and comprehensive picture of the State’s compliance with its obligations. This may be achieved by piecing together, in a well - structured way, a broad range of information encompassi ng declared, undeclared, international technical monitoring data, information from national technical means, open source, state - level, and international trade and diplomacy related to the material and capabilities under consideration. The paper proposes a state - level analytical approach to be considered in developing future arms reductions initiatives based on the IAEA’s State - Level Concept (SLC). The SLC outlines sequences of activities (cheating pathways) that a State could consider to acquire weapons u sable material. It analyzes all plausible CPs aiming to determine whether a proposed set of safeguards measures will be sufficient. Mapping out the CPs is essentially producing a state - specific network of process and material and flows with identified node s for inter - connections. The “relative attractiveness” of a CP, or usefulness in a nuclear weapons program, is considered in addition to the time it would take to implement such a process in a country. The SLC might allow State - specific approaches to nuc lear arms control with differentiation between States, taking into account all information available to the authorities and being responsive to the variations in risk of cheating . Similar to the IAEA SLC, the process could be implemented in three steps: ( i ) Identification of cheating pathways (CP), ( ii) Specification and prioritization of State - specific technical objectives, ( iii) Identification of verification measures to address the technical objectives. Initial consideration of using this methodology to verify nuclear materials in states possessing nuclear weapons is outlined. Suggested next steps for applying this appr oach for weapons are discussed.