Year
2001
Abstract
The application of game theory to the design of Material, Control and Accounting (MC&A) sampling plans is discussed. Game theory can be applied to situations where there is an interdependency among the relevant decision-makers. In the context of MC&A sampling plans this interdependency could include relationships between the sampling plan designer and the regulator, the sampling plan designer and the facility/operations group, or the sampling plan designer and a postulated diverter of nuclear material. The game structure is formulated by considering sampling plans options set against the choices of an decision-maker. The optimal strategies between different interdependent relationships are examined in terms of choosing a sampling plan. To illustrate the optimization of the frequency of sampling, a payoff table between a sampling plan designer and a postulated diverted is constructed. Finally, an example of sensitivity analysis is conducted to illustrate the dependency of a sampling plan equilibrium to assumed payoffs.