Alternatives to Formal Arms Control

The Obama Administration is committed to pursuing formal arms control, but the path ahead will be difficult. The implementation of New START is proceeding well, but the rest of the Administration’s agenda outlined in the landmark Prague speech in 2009, and reiterated in Berlin in 2013, is stalemated and near-term progress faces significant headwinds. The prospects for follow-on negotiations to New START appear to be limited at present. The Russians have been reluctant to engage and have very different ideas on the scope of the negotiations. The Russians have called for multilateral negotiations that address ballistic missile defenses as well as space and conventional strike weaponry. US priorities, which involve bilateral negotiations on strategic and non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons, are difficult technically and politically. The prospect of addressing non-strategic nuclear forces (NSNF), non-deployed warheads and warhead verification is daunting. In addition to intrinsic difficulties, the US and Russian positions suggest a need for complex grand bargains, which would differ in content, scope and focus. Movement toward multilateralizing arms reductions as we move to lower numbers is unlikely in the near term, as it depends on further bilateral cuts and faces political opposition in most weapon states. CTBT ratification by the United States remains uncertain and ultimate entry into force is unlikely in the near term. Finally, FMCT negotiations remain stalled, and even if they were initiated, the difficult substantive issues involved suggest a treaty would not be concluded any time soon. In order to advance the President’s agenda, it may be necessary to explore alternatives to formal treaties. A series of possible alternatives to traditional arms control might be pursued, including unilateral, reciprocal force decisions, codes of conduct and transparency and confidence-building measures. These or other alternatives could be pursued to achieve progress and, it has been argued, possibly create conditions for further movement in formal arms control. This paper explores the modalities and prospects of the range of possible alternatives to formal arms control.