Advantages of a Tritium Control Regime for Arms Control

Year
2011
Author(s)
William Karl Pitts - Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
Alex C. Misner - Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
Abstract
Monitoring the production and processing of tritium has certain advantages in regulating the number of nuclear weapons. Unlike special nuclear material, where there are existing large stocks of material and weapon components available to all nuclear weapons states, the nuclear decay of tritium requires its continued production, processing and purification for use in nuclear weapons. A tritium control regime may be particularly well suited to control certain features of a nuclear weapon state’s stockpile in a non-intrusive fashion. Tritium may also be especially well suited as a confidence building measure to restrain breakout scenarios in which decommissioned weapons might be brought back into service. If tritium is controlled and assayed as a material, there is no weapon design information that can be revealed. Non-destructive assay could be performed without the need for an information barrier, giving high confidence in a nation’s declaration. Tritium control has advantages for regulating larger stockpiles. In 1999, for example, the United State’s Department of Defense declared that yearly production of 1.5 kg of tritium would be required to sustain a stockpile of approximately 4000 weapons allowed under the proposed Start II accord. Producing and processing kilogram quantities of tritium requires a significant industrial plant, reducing the likelihood of clandestine production that could affect the number of deployable weapons. PNNL is currently preparing an evaluation of the utility of a tritium control regime for arms control and possible implementation actions. An overview of that work will be presented.